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Tesla, Inc. (TSLA)

Fiscal year ended Dec 31, 2025 · 10-K filed Jan 29, 2026 · All figures in USD millions unless stated
Source: Tesla FY2025 10-K (SEC EDGAR accession 0001628280-26-003952), Note 2 (Revenue Disaggregation) & Note 19 (Segment Reporting)

Revenue by product line (FY2025 vs FY2024 vs FY2023)

Product line 2025 ($M) 2024 ($M) 2023 ($M) YoY 25/24 2yr CAGR % of 2025 rev
Total revenues 94,82797,69096,773 −2.9%−1.0%100.0%
Automotive sales 65,82172,48078,509 −9.2%−8.4%69.4%
Automotive regulatory credits 1,9932,7631,790 −27.9%+5.5%2.1%
Automotive leasing 1,7121,8272,120 −6.3%−10.1%1.8%
Energy generation & storage — sales 12,2709,5645,515 +28.3%+49.2%12.9%
Energy generation & storage — leasing 501522520 −4.0%−1.8%0.5%
Services & other 12,53010,5348,319 +18.9%+22.7%13.2%

What each product line actually is (plain English)

Automotive sales — $65.8B (69% of revenue)

What it is: Cars Tesla builds and sells outright. The mass-market Model Y (compact SUV — the single biggest revenue contributor, also the best-selling car in the world by unit) and Model 3 (sedan) together make up the vast majority of volume. The low-volume halo products are Model S (luxury sedan) and Model X (luxury SUV). Newer additions: Cybertruck (angular stainless-steel pickup, launched late-2023) and Semi (Class-8 electric freight truck, still in limited production).

How revenue is recognized: at the moment a customer takes delivery of the vehicle.

Why it fell 9.2% YoY / 8.4% CAGR: average selling prices dropped as Tesla cut list prices repeatedly to defend market share against Chinese OEMs (BYD in particular) and legacy automakers' EV lineups; unit volume was also softer than 2022–2023 peaks. The refresh cycle for Models 3/Y is aging and Cybertruck has been a commercial disappointment relative to initial reservation counts.

Automotive regulatory credits — $2.0B (2% of revenue)

What it is: Near-100% gross-margin money from other automakers. Governments (US states under CARB, the EU, China, etc.) require legacy automakers to sell some minimum share of zero-emission vehicles. When Ford, Stellantis, or GM can't hit their quota, they buy "ZEV credits" from Tesla — which earns credits automatically every time it sells an EV.

Why this matters: it's almost pure profit — there are essentially no COGS against it. But it's structurally declining: as other OEMs electrify their own fleets, their need to buy credits goes to zero. The −27.9% YoY drop in 2025 is the single clearest sign this line is shrinking toward irrelevance. When it goes away, ~$2B of roughly 100%-margin profit disappears — a direct hit to operating income that won't show up in any revenue rollup because by then the line will have vanished.

Automotive leasing — $1.7B (2% of revenue)

What it is: Tesla's own leasing program — the customer doesn't own the car, they pay a fixed monthly amount and return it at lease-end. Tesla keeps the vehicle on its balance sheet as a leased asset and recognizes the monthly payments as revenue over the 2- or 3-year lease term.

Why it's small: Tesla historically hasn't pushed leasing hard (until recently it didn't let lessees buy out the car at lease-end — it planned to repurpose them into a future robotaxi fleet). A shrinking line because new-car prices fell (lower prices → lower lease payments per car) and Tesla has shifted toward third-party financing.

Energy generation & storage — sales — $12.3B (13% of revenue, +28% YoY)

What it is: This is the growth engine. Three distinct products: Why it grew 28%: Megapack demand is outstripping supply. Utilities worldwide need grid-scale storage to integrate renewables, and Megapack has become the market-leading product by reliability + $/kWh. This is the line bulls point to as the "Tesla is an energy company, not a car company" thesis.

Energy generation & storage — leasing — $0.5B (0.5% of revenue)

What it is: Solar leasing — customer installs Tesla solar panels but doesn't buy them; Tesla owns the system and the customer pays monthly (similar economics to Sunrun). A legacy of the SolarCity acquisition that's been wound down over the years.

Services & other — $12.5B (13% of revenue, +19% YoY)

What it is: Everything that isn't selling a new car or a battery. Main components: Why it grew 19%: the installed fleet keeps getting bigger (more cars out in the world = more service, more Supercharging) and NACS-adoption means every US fast-charge network now sends paying non-Tesla customers to Tesla Superchargers.

Revenue & gross profit by reportable segment

Tesla reports two segments. The split is the same as the product view, just rolled up: Automotive segment = automotive sales + regulatory credits + automotive leasing + a small services allocation; Energy segment = energy sales + energy leasing.
Segment 2025 ($M) 2024 ($M) 2023 ($M) YoY 25/24 2yr CAGR 2025 gross margin
Total revenues 94,82797,69096,773 −2.9%−1.0%18.0%
Automotive segment 82,05687,60490,738 −6.3%−4.9%16.2%
Energy gen & storage segment 12,77110,0866,035 +26.6%+45.3%29.8%

Gross profit by segment ($M)

Segment 2025 GP 2024 GP 2023 GP 2025 GM % 2024 GM % 2023 GM %
Total 17,09417,45017,660 18.0%17.9%18.2%
Automotive 13,29214,81016,519 16.2%16.9%18.2%
Energy 3,8022,6401,141 29.8%26.2%18.9%

Revenue by geography

Region 2025 ($M) 2024 ($M) 2023 ($M) YoY 25/24 2yr CAGR % of 2025
United States 47,62747,72545,235 −0.2%+2.6%50.2%
China 20,96220,94421,745 +0.1%−1.8%22.1%
Other international 26,23829,02129,793 −9.6%−6.1%27.7%
What this mix tells you
The bear-vs-bull framing in one line
Data extracted programmatically from SEC EDGAR filing 0001628280-26-003952 (TSLA 10-K, R44/R93/R94). Layman explanations written by Claude.